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The Differential Effects of Initiatives and
Referenda on Voter Turnout in the
United States, 1890–2008
Matt Childers & Mike Binder*
INTRODUCTION
A number of studies show that statewide ballot propositions
increase voter turnout, but almost all of them focus on the citizen
initiative. In this Article, we use a historical dataset with
elections and census data dating back to 1890 to examine
whether popular and legislative referenda also affect turnout. We
also compare how they affect turnout compared to the citizen
initiative. Like previous studies, we find that ballot propositions
fail to significantly affect turnout in presidential elections over
time, but do so during midterm elections.1 Initiative races, both
competitive and less competitive ones, increase turnout more
than competitive legislative referenda, while uncompetitive
legislative referenda and popular referenda do not affect turnout.
In their efforts to uncover the determinants of political
participation, scholars often focus on individual-level factors like
race, education, income, or age,2 and external factors like
campaigns and electoral institutions.3 Under the umbrella of the
latter, students of direct democracy find that ballot propositions
can draw voters to the polls. While they offer differing
explanations for the causal mechanisms for how ballot questions
draw more voters to the polls, they agree that turnout is higher
when states have initiatives on the ballot.4
* Matt Childers and Mike Binder are Assistant Professors of Political Science at
University of North Florida.
1 See Matt Childers & Mike Binder, Engaged by the Initiative? How the Use of
Citizen Initiatives Increases Voter Turnout, 65 POL. RES. Q. 93, 93–103 (2012).
2 See
generally STEVEN ROSENSTONE & JOHN HANSEN, MOBILIZATION,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Bruce Nichols & Robert Miller eds., 1993).
3 See Gary C. Jacobson, How Do Campaigns Matter?, 18 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 31,
38–39 (2015) (discussing political science research on how campaigns affect voter
turnout). See generally André Blais, What Affects Voter Turnout?, 9 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI.
111, 111–25 (2006) (demonstrating how institutions affect voter turnout across multiple
democracies).
4 See Childers & Binder, supra note 1; Daniel Schlozman & Ian Yohai, How
Initiatives Don’t Always Make Citizens: Ballot Initiatives in the American States,
1978−2004, 30 POL. BEHAV. 469 (2008); Mark A. Smith, The Contingent Effects of Ballot
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Almost all of this research centers on the citizen initiative,
and we speculate that this may be due to the nature of the
institution itself. Initiatives often attract significant levels of
media attention, like California’s Proposition 8 in 2008,
Washington’s and Colorado’s medical marijuana propositions in
2012, and California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. Initiatives may
also deal with controversial social issues and motivate people to
pay attention and vote.5 For these reasons and others, scholars
argue that the institution gives citizens great incentives to not
only use initiatives but to also participate in politics.6
Consequently, the institution should engage the electorate in
states where they are used.
We agree with other scholars that initiatives can stimulate
political participation, but, in this Article we argue that other
types of ballot propositions also have the potential to engage the
electorate. Many states with the initiative also have the popular
referendum, an institution that gives citizens the opportunity to
reject unpopular laws by placing them on the ballot. On the other
hand, all fifty states either allow or require the legislature to
refer certain policies directly to the voters.7
We argue that, from the voter’s perspective, referenda are
not inherently different than initiatives and that their campaigns
can mobilize voters. Thus, we explore the differential effects that
citizen initiatives, popular referenda, and legislative referenda
may have on voter turnout. Using a historical dataset dating
back to 1890, we conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis of
these relationships, controlling for historically important
electoral reforms, variations in the political environment, and
changes in the population over time.
Our evidence shows that, in addition to initiatives,
legislative referenda can stimulate turnout in states, but we
argue that this is because of their campaigns to mobilize voters.
As others show, ballot measures do not stimulate turnout in
Initiatives and Candidate Races on Turnout, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 700 (2001); Caroline
J. Tolbert, Daniel C. Bowen & Todd Donovan, Initiative Campaigns: Direct Democracy
and Voter Mobilization, 37 AM. POL. RES. 155 (2009); Caroline J. Tolbert, John
A. Grummel & Daniel A. Smith, The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the
American States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625 (2001); Caroline J. Tolbert & Daniel A. Smith, The
Educative Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout, 33 AM. POL. RES. 283 (2005).
5 Daniel R. Biggers, When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and
Their Impact on Turnout, 33 POL. BEHAV. 3, 8–15 (2011).
6 See generally DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY
INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004).
7 Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.nc
sl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx
[http://perma.cc/YB36-KTRG].
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presidential elections, but they do so in midterm elections.8 While
initiatives and competitive legislative referenda lead to greater
turnout rates, both competitive and uncompetitive initiatives
increase turnout more than competitive legislative referenda.
Neither less competitive legislative nor popular referenda have
statistically significant effects on a state’s turnout rate.
In the following sections, this Article will proceed as
follows: we begin by discussing how the current literature on
direct democracy and political engagement mainly focuses on
initiatives and ignores legislative and popular referenda.
Afterward, we discuss why it is an important oversight in the
literature and theorize that referenda can also positively impact
a state’s turnout rate, though to lesser degrees than citizen
initiatives. Finally, we present and discuss our findings and
conclude.
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND VOTER TURNOUT
Research on political engagement consistently demonstrates
that electoral institutions both directly and indirectly impact
political participation across the states. Some changes, like poll
taxes, were designed with the intention of suppressing turnout
among various population groups9 and, consequently, voter
turnout rates were lower in the former Confederate states than
the rest of the nation throughout most of the twentieth century.10
Turnout tends to be higher in states with more flexible voter
registration laws than those with stricter registration
procedures.11 Changes to electoral institutions can also have
unintended consequences on political participation rates. For
example, as states gradually adopted the secret ballot in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, turnout rates
declined.12

8 See Childers & Binder, supra note 1; Schlozman & Yohai, supra note 4; Tolbert
& Smith, supra note 4.
9 V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (Univ. Tenn. Press
1984) (1949).
10 MELANIE J. SPRINGER, HOW THE STATES SHAPED THE NATION: AMERICAN
ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND VOTER TURNOUT, 1920–2000, at 137–43 (Benjamin I. Page,
Susan Herbst, Lawrence R. Jacobs & Adam J. Berinsky eds., 2014).
11 Barry C. Burden et al., Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The
Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 95, 95–109 (2014).
12 See Jac C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates, 82
PUB. CHOICE 107, 118–19 (1995) (estimating that introducing the secret ballot decreased
gubernatorial election turnout across the states by an average of 7% while controlling for
changes in other electoral laws); see also Childers & Binder, supra note 4, at 99 (finding
similar results, Childers and Binder show that presidential election turnout rates
declined by approximately 5% across the states and congressional election year turnout
rates declined by about 7%).
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In the late nineteenth century, Progressives advocated for
direct democracy because it would make Americans better
citizens. “Progressives thought that having plebiscites on policy
issues would encourage citizens to become more politically
engaged, thereby mitigating the declining state of civic affairs
and public discourse.”13 Nathan Cree argued in 1892 that direct
democracy would lead voters to think about the substance of
policy dilemmas instead of considering policy proposals as
partisan appeals. The consequence would enlighten citizens and
weaken the parties’ influence over politics.14
Since the turn of the twentieth century, twenty-four states
have adopted either the citizen initiative or popular referendum.
The initiative allows citizens to bypass the state’s legislature,
putting a proposed policy on the ballot if they collect a certain
number of signatures.15 The proposed policy may either be a
statutory measure or a constitutional amendment (this varies by
state). Popular referenda allow citizens to gather signatures to
place a law on the ballot for the electorate to approve or reject. As
seen in Table 1,16 most states that have the initiative also have
the popular referendum, but there are a few with only one or the
other.17
Table 1: States with Initiatives, Popular Referenda,
and Legislative Referenda18

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Initiative

Popular
Referendum

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

Legislative Referenda A
Constitutional
Statutes C
Amendments B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 6, at xvi.
NATHAN CREE, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE PEOPLE 16 (1892).
Signature requirements vary by state.
16 See infra Table 1.
17 See Audrey Wall, The Book of the States 2014, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS KNOWLEDGE
CTR. (October 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/contenttype/bos-2014.
18 See State-by-State List on Initiative and Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE
& REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandr institute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm [http://perma.
cc/2FKX-D42X]; see also Initiative, Referendum and Recall, supra note 7.
13
14
15
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Legislative Referenda A
Constitutional
Statutes C
Amendments B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Illinois
X
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
X
Louisiana
Maine
X
X
Maryland
X
Massachusetts
X
X
Michigan
X
X
Minnesota
Mississippi
X
Missouri
X
X
Montana
X
X
Nebraska
X
X
Nevada
X
X
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
X
New Mexico
X
X
X
New York
X
North Carolina
X
North Dakota
X
X
X
X
Ohio
X
X
X
X
Oklahoma
X
X
X
X
Oregon
X
X
X
X
Pennsylvania
X
Rhode Island
X
South Carolina
X
South Dakota
X
X
X
X
Tennessee
X
Texas
X
Utah
X
X
X
X
Vermont
X
Virginia
X
Washington
X
X
X
X
West Virginia
X
Wisconsin
X
Wyoming
X
X
X
Number of
24
24
49
23
States
A: Legislative referenda are divided into two categories: (1) constitutional amendments
that are placed on the ballot by the legislature or by a government body; and (2)
legislative statutes (binding or non-binding, depending on the state) placed on the ballot
by the legislature or by the government.
B: Every state but Delaware is required by its constitution to place legislative
amendments on the ballot for the voters’ approval. Delaware is the only state that has a
constitution that does not require public approval for constitutional amendments passed
by the legislature.
C: These states are not required to place legislative statutes on the ballot, but the state’s
constitution gives the legislature the authority to place statutes on the ballot for the
voter’s approval.
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Unfortunately, the adoption of direct democracy has not
necessarily produced a more knowledgeable electorate. Tolbert,
McNeal, and Smith use survey data from the 1996, 1998, and
2000 American National Election Studies to show that exposure
has positively and statistically significant effects on their levels
of general political knowledge in 1996, but not in 1998 or 2000.19
More recent research using the 2004 and 2008 National
Annenberg Election Surveys and the 2006 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study showed much of the same: exposure
to initiatives did not lead to increases in Americans’ general
political knowledge.20
Direct democracy has, on the other hand, increased voter
turnout when citizen initiatives are on the ballot in
nonpresidential election years. A number of the early studies on
this topic showed that as the number of initiatives on a state’s
ballot increases, so too does the state’s voter turnout rate in both
presidential and nonpresidential election years.21 Those studies’
authors inferred that the Progressives were right: the initiative
process increases turnout because citizens learn about the issues
on the ballot and are, therefore, more likely to vote. This effect
increases in magnitude as the electorate places more policy
questions on a state’s ballot. Unfortunately, the time period of
each study began in the 1970s, decades after states began
adopting and placing policy questions on the ballot.22 From a
research design perspective, it left open the possibility that other
political phenomena that surfaced between the turn of the
century and the time of their study may have affected voter
turnout instead of initiative elections.
Subsequent work by the authors using elections and
demographic data before and after states adopted the initiative
process made a number of important findings that advanced our
understanding of how direct democracy affects voter turnout.23
First, simply adopting the institution into the state’s constitution
had no significant effect on a state’s turnout rate over time.
Second, having used it in the past also failed to stimulate turnout
19 Caroline J. Tolbert, Ramona S. McNeal & Daniel A. Smith, Enhancing Civic
Engagement: The Effect of Direct Democracy on Political Participation and Knowledge,
3 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 23, 31–34 (2003).
20 Nicholas R. Seabrook, Joshua J. Dyck & Edward L. Lascher, Jr., Do Ballot
Initiatives Increase General Political Knowledge?, 37 POL. BEHAV. 279, 297 (2015).
21 See Tolbert, Grummel & Smith, supra note 4, at 635–639; Tolbert & Smith, supra
note 4, at 296–302.
22 Both studies use different, yet overlapping time periods: Tolbert, Grummel
& Smith, supra note 4 (measuring the voting age population (VAP) turnout from
1970−1996); Tolbert & Smith, supra note 4 (evaluating the voting eligible population
(VEP) turnout rate from 1980–2002).
23 Childers & Binder, supra note 1.
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in a given election. Third, like Schlozman and Yohai found using
fewer elections, initiatives on a ballot fail to significantly affect
voter turnout during presidential elections, but they do increase
turnout in off-year elections.24 These results should not be
terribly surprising because presidential campaigns are much
more intense than any other election and dominate media
coverage and the electorate’s attention. Thus, it is difficult for
initiative campaigns to connect with the electorate. Off-year
electoral environments are much less intense and ballot measure
campaigns stand a better chance to connect with voters.25
Most importantly, the authors found that competitive
initiative elections stimulate turnout much more so than less
competitive ones.26 This implies that campaigns and political
competition mobilize voters to the polls, not just the presence of a
policy question on the ballot. The authors conceded that the best
measures of campaign intensity are campaign expenditure data
or campaign advertising data, but those measures only recently
became available on the federal level. Campaign expenditure
data of any sort was not available before the 1970s, when the
Federal Election Commission began requiring federal election
campaigns to report their finances.27 In more recent years, states
began requiring state-level campaigns to report their finances.28
Yet, recent work using total initiative campaign spending per
capita (across all initiatives) in a given state shows that total
spending leads to higher turnout. This lends additional credence
to the notion that political competition in initiative campaigns
mobilizes voters rather than just the mere presence of a ballot
question in the election.

24 Schlozman & Yohai, supra note 4 (using a time period similar to Smith and
Tolbert studies, Schlozman and Yohai find that initiatives fail to statistically significantly
increase turnout in presidential election years, but do so in midterm congressional
election years).
25 Id. at 476 (making a similar argument about presidential elections and initiative
campaigns’ inability to affect turnout).
26 See Childers & Binder, supra note 1. Childers and Binder compared how the
number of “competitive” initiatives on the ballot affected turnout compared to the number
of “uncompetitive” ones. Id. at 97–100. They define a competitive campaign as an election
where the margin of victory was within ten percentage points and uncompetitive elections
were those with margins of victories greater than ten. Id. at 97. The authors based their
definitions on the congressional elections literature, where elections are commonly
considered to be competitive if the marginal of victory was within ten percentage points.
Id.; see also GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (Reid
Hester ed., 8th ed. 2013).
27 JACOBSON, supra note 26, at 66, 179.
28 See generally Tolbert, Bowen & Donovan, supra note 4.
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II. THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATIVE AND POPULAR REFERENDA
Research on how direct democracy affects political
participation has centered on the citizen initiative even though in
many state elections, citizens are also voting on ballot questions
that are popular referenda or legislative referenda. Popular
referenda allow citizens to place unpopular laws on the ballot by
gathering a certain number of signatures. But, one reason why
they may have received less attention in research than initiatives
may be due to the fact that they are rarely used. Figures 1 and 2
plot the number of propositions on statewide ballots from 1900
through 2008.29
Another reason why scholars may have focused almost
exclusively on initiatives is because they may be more salient in
an election year than referenda. Some ballot questions in the
past have attracted substantial media attention and have shaped
the debate in campaigns at the top of the ticket. Stephen
Nicholson shows that in California elections, the most salient
initiatives not only raise the public’s awareness of the issues,
they can shape the agenda of campaigns at the top of the ticket.30
Furthermore, some initiative content centers on controversial
social issues or wedge issues, and this helps them attract media
attention and voters’ attention.31 For example, in 2008,
Proposition 8 was discussed regularly on the national news. In
2004, eleven states placed bans on same-sex marriage on their
ballots and same-sex marriage subsequently was a salient issue
in the campaign.32 Thus, initiatives may be logically more likely
to impact political participation in a state than other ballot
questions.
Popular referenda allow citizens the chance to reject
unpopular laws passed by the state’s legislature. They are
available in twenty-four states; most also have the citizen
initiative. It is not used as frequently as the other forms of
democracy, as Figures 1 and 2 convey, but they have the
potential to garner some campaign activity since signature
gathering is a costly endeavor.33

See infra Figure 1, Figure 2.
See STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS, AND
BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 1 (2005).
31 See Daniel Biggers, When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and
Their Impact on Turnout, 33 POL. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2011).
32 See Alan Abramowitz, Terrorism, Gay Marriage, and Incumbency: Explaining the
Republican Victory in the 2004 Presidential Election, 2 FORUM 1, 4 (2004).
33 See infra Figure 1, Figure 2.
29
30
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Figure 1: The Number of Ballot Propositions in
Presidential Elections, 1892–200834

Figure 2: The Number of Ballot Propositions in
Midterm Elections, 1890–200635

34 Ballot Measures Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/ballot-measures-database.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
35 Id.
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On the other hand, the nature of the legislative referendum
reveals that it also may have the potential to garner campaigns
and mobilize votes. The institution is a part of every state’s
constitution, and it is a policy question that the legislature refers
to the voters, either because of a constitutional requirement or
because the political environment incentivizes legislators to do
so. In all but one state, Delaware, the constitution requires the
legislature to refer any constitutional amendments to the
electorate for approval) (see Table 1). Many of them also require
the legislature to place measures about bonds and tax changes on
the ballot. Twenty-three states (including Delaware) allow the
legislature to place statutes (binding and non-binding) on a
statewide ballot.36 At times, legislators may seek to refer issues
to voters for their approval to avoid being responsible for the
policy (like tax increases, for example) or because the political
environment in the legislature pushes lawmakers to pass the
policy question on to the voters to decide, rather than take on the
issue themselves.37
Legislative referenda are used more often than other forms
of ballot questions, but they tend to tackle issues that are more
technical and less controversial than those that many citizen
initiatives do and are less likely to capture the public’s
attention.38 Measures about issuing public bonds or changing tax
rates are less controversial than much of the content of citizen
initiatives, and may be less likely to affect voter turnout.39 This
argument has some empirical support. While it was not their
primary concern, Kimball and Kropf noted that in their news
coverage data, legislative referenda received significantly less
media attention than citizen initiatives in the 2004 elections.40
The data partially confirms claims that initiatives are more
controversial than referenda. Figure 3 shows the percentage of
ballot measures that meet the voters’ approval (they garner
majority support).41 The voters approved less than half of all
citizen initiatives after 1910, but voters approved a majority of
36 Table: 1.2: States with Legislative Referendum (LR) for Statutes and
Constitutional Amendments, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.
org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Requirements/Legislative%
20Referendum%20States.pdf [http://perma.cc/67KR-S69V].
37 See David F. Damore, Shaun Bowler & Stephen P. Nicholson, Agenda Setting by
Direct Democracy: Comparing the Initiative and the Referendum. 12 ST. POL & POL’Y Q.
367, 370 (2012).
38 See supra Figure 1, Figure 2.
39 See Tolbert, Grummel & Smith, supra note 4, at 627; accord Tolbert, Bowen
& Donovan, supra note 4, at 158.
40 See David C. Kimball & Martha Kropf, Voting Technology, Ballot Measures, and
Residual Votes, 36 AM. POL. RES. 479, 483–84. (2008).
41 Id.
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legislative referenda. Popular referenda are more successful than
initiatives at times, but are not consistently so.
Figure 3: The Percentage of Ballot Measures that Receive Majority
Support, by Decade, 1900–200842

III. WHY REFERENDA MAY ALSO STIMULATE TURNOUT
Despite the previous arguments and the pattern
immediately above, we contend that it is worth exploring
whether referenda mobilize voters or not. States use the
legislative referenda more often than the other ballot measures
and some of them may draw voters to the polls. Even though the
content of legislative referenda may be less technical and, on the
surface, less controversial than some citizen initiatives (like
those that deal with social issues or wedge issues), ballot
questions dealing with taxes, government spending, and public
debt can draw the public’s ire and motivate an interest group to
organize a campaign in support of or opposition to the matter at
hand. Popular referenda also require some campaign
organization since those measures have to attract a certain
number of signatures to get onto the ballot. Thus, they have the
potential to stimulate turnout if their races are competitive.
If legislative referenda or popular referenda increase
turnout, it is because their campaigns mobilize voters. Ballot

42

Id.
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proposition campaigns, regardless of whether they are placed on
the ballot by the legislature or by citizens, are typically
low-information and low-salience affairs.43 While a small number
of initiatives attract a lot of media attention, many do not. Most
Americans are not particularly politically knowledgeable about
national politics and are often not very familiar with propositions
that are on the ballot.44 Unless an election is right around the
corner, most Americans are not following politics very closely and
are therefore not systematically differentiating between the three
forms of ballot measures when they enter the voting booth or fill
out their absentee ballot.45 Thus, the typical citizen is not likely
to be motivated to vote by an initiative or referendum unless a
campaign engaged them.
We expect competitive races to stimulate turnout more than
uncompetitive ones because they give rise to greater mobilization
efforts than other races. The literature we have previously
discussed shows that competitive initiatives elections stimulate
turnout than less competitive elections.46 Furthermore,
campaigns mobilize voters by reducing the costs of learning
about the measures and by lowering peoples’ costs of getting to
the polls.47 They help inform citizens about proposed policies
See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN
UNITED STATES 78 (1984); Tolbert, Grummel & Smith, supra note 4, at 627. See
generally Robert J. Lacey, The Electoral Allure of Direct Democracy: The Effect of
Initiative Salience on Voting, 1990–96, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 168 (2005); Arthur Lupia,
Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance
Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994).
44 MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI AND SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS passim (1996); see also Stephen P. Nicholson, The Political
Environment and Ballot Proposition Awareness, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI 403, 403–10 (2003).
Nicholson analyzes fifty years of surveys done by the California Field Poll asking
Californians about whether they had read, heard, or seen anything about particular ballot
initiatives. On average, 64% of Californians reported being aware of the initiative in
question, but the standard deviation was 19%. Nicholson notes that the Field Poll usually
only inquires about ballot propositions that were already relatively salient in media
coverage, implying that even fewer Californians were aware of ballot propositions that
were not on the ballot. Id. at 404–06.
45 Anthony Downs argued that most Americans are not primarily motivated by
politics and are not motivated to learn a lot about their government or the people in it.
See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). For
example, only 15% of Americans admitted to following news about the 2014 midterm
elections very closely in the first week of October 2014. See Public Divided Over Whether
Secret Service Lapses Signal ‘Broader Problems,’ PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/10/06/public-divided-over-whether-secret-service-lapsessignal-broader-problems/#the-weeks-news [http://perma.cc/A6LC-9BCV].
46 See Childers & Binder, supra note 1, at 93.
47 See Gary C. Jacobson, How Do Campaigns Matter?, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 31,
31−47 (2015). Popkin shows how voters acquire information and use it while not closely
following politics as well as how campaigns tailor their strategies to exploit that. See
generally SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATIONS AND PERSUASION
IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2d ed. 1994). Riker and Ordeshook model the individual’s
cost and benefit calculus in deciding whether to vote and conclude that people vote if their
43

THE

Do Not Delete

2016]

2/14/2016 9:56 AM

The Differential Effects of Initiatives & Referenda

47

because they package their information in accessible formats and
load their messages with informative cues.48 Furthermore,
campaigns raise and spend more money as races get more
competitive.49 Within each campaign, they allocate their
resources in places where they expect the election to be closest
and where they can mobilize as many supporters (and probable
supporters) per dollar as possible.50 For example, in the 2000
presidential election, the Bush and Gore campaigns allocated
most of their resources to relatively few media markets in
battleground states.51 Research on congressional and presidential
elections shows that turnout and political awareness tend to be
higher in areas where campaigns allocate more resources
compared to areas where they allocate less.52 Political
competition stimulates campaign intensity and campaign
intensity mobilizes citizens.
It is also possible that the causal arrow can point in the
opposite direction, that campaign intensity can make an election
more competitive. We acknowledge that this can happen, but the
nature and timing of an election cycle suggests that it is more
often the case that political competition drives campaign
intensity than the other way around. Candidates (and their
campaigns), as well as party elites, have always had a strong
grasp of what the political environment looked like early on in a
campaign cycle and adjusted their strategies accordingly. Even in
the late nineteenth century, politicians could accurately predict
which races would be “sure victories, certain defeats, and which
contests would be close and require attention. . . . They
pinpointed the difference, and sought means to gain them.”53 The
congressional elections literature also shows that conditions
early on in the election cycle, even well before the end of the
primary season, determine whether quality challengers step up
to challenge an incumbent or jump into the primaries of both
parties to contend for open seats.54

perceived benefits and their sense of duty in the democratic system outweigh the costs
associated with voting. William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus
of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25 (1968).
48 See Lupia, supra note 43, at 63. See generally POPKIN, supra note 47.
49 See JACOBSON, supra note 26, at 42–43; DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES OF 2000 AND 2004, at 73 (2006).
50 See ROBERT D. MARCUS, GRAND OLD PARTY: POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN THE GILDED
AGE 1880–1896, at 6 (1971); SHAW, supra note 49, at 78; Larry M. Bartels, Resource
Allocation in a Presidential Campaign, 47 J. POL. 928, 929 (1985).
51 See SHAW, supra note 49, at 78.
52 See JACOBSON, supra note 26, at 85; SHAW, supra note 49, at 128.
53 See MARCUS, supra note 50, at 11.
54 See JACOBSON, supra note 26, at 47. See generally GARY C. JACOBSON & SAMUEL
KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1981).
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We also expect to see that competitive initiatives will
stimulate turnout more than competitive popular referenda and
competitive legislative referenda because initiatives are more
likely to stimulate active campaigns. Legislative referenda are
placed on the ballot by a state’s legislature whereas initiatives go
through a costly statewide signature-gathering phase. The
citizen initiative process has engendered campaign industries in
its states as well as attracted growth in the number of interest
groups tied to policy measures that are placed on the ballot.55
Popular referenda entail a similar process, but it is in reaction to
particular pieces of legislation. Thus, there is not quite the same
interest group infrastructure centered on the institution.
IV. DATA
We explore how legislative and popular referenda affect
turnout compared to initiatives using a time-series
cross-sectional design with data from 1890–2008 and focus our
analysis on federal election years. Our dataset pools statewide
elections data from 1890–2008. Our study is not an experimental
design (the gold standard for research analysis) because our
causal mechanism (initiatives and referenda) is not randomly
assigned to states across elections. Changes in the political
conditions in a state affect whether initiatives or referenda
appear on a statewide ballot and whether they engender
campaigns, as the previous sections described; thus, our
treatment is not randomly assigned. Our study also lacks a
control group because every state has a form of the legislative
referendum.
We are able to guard against some threats to the validity of
our research design that are present when a causal mechanism is
not randomly assigned. The study’s long time series and repeated
measurements (a state having ballot propositions in multiple
elections over time) guard against historical threats to validity.56
Different sets of states have ballot propositions on the ballot from
election to election, allowing us to isolate the effects of different
ballot measures on turnout over time, minimizing some threats
to internal validity.57

55 Frederick J. Boehmke, Sources of Variation in the Frequency of Statewide
Initiatives: The Role of Interest Group Populations, 58 POL. RES. Q. 565 (2005). See
generally MAGLEBY, supra note 43.
56 See WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CASUAL
INFERENCE 39 (2002).
57 See WILLIAM M.K. TROCHIM & JAMES P. DONNELLY, RESEARCH METHODS
KNOWLEDGE BASE 7 (3d ed. 2001).
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Our dependent variable is the statewide voting-eligible
population (VEP) turnout rate. The VEP rate is a more accurate
measure of political participation over time than the voting age
population measure.58 The data comes from two sources: data
from 1890–1978 is from Jerrold Rusk and data from 1980–2008
is from Michael McDonald.59 We use the turnout rate based on
the number of votes cast for the highest office. In midterm
elections, we supplement Rusk’s congressional VEP data with
Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan’s senatorial and then
gubernatorial election turnout data, if available.60 If that data is
not available, we use the congressional VEP turnout rate. For
years that both Rusk’s and McDonald’s data overlap (1980–1996),
they correlate at 0.99.
We expect political competition to increase turnout and we
measure the effects of mobilization using competitiveness as a
proxy. That is, we measure the number of competitive and
“uncompetitive” initiative and referenda campaigns. We consider
a campaign to be competitive if the margin of victory is within
ten percentage points, as the authors did in their 2012 article
measuring how initiatives affect turnout over time.61 By
extension, a race is “uncompetitive” if the margin of victory is
over ten points.
Our measure of competitiveness is an imperfect proxy for
campaign intensity, but evidence from the literature strongly
suggests that it captures political competition as well as
campaign intensity. In the congressional elections literature, the
most common threshold for determining whether an election is
competitive is a margin of victory less than or equal to 10%.62
Holbrook and Wenschenk studied campaign intensity and
turnout in mayoral elections and showed that the degree of
parity in campaign expenditures between opposing candidates
and the winner’s margin of victory are correlated at 0.67.63 They
58 See Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,
95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963, 963 (2001).
59 See generally JERROLD G. RUSK, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE (2001); Michael P. McDonald, Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT,
http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data [http://perma.cc/6FDJ7LXJ].
60 See W. Dean Burnham, Jerome M. Clubb & William Flanigan,
State-Level
Congressional, Gubernatorial, and Senatorial Election Data for the United States,
1824-1972 (ICPSR 75), ICPSR (June 19, 1984), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICP
SR/studies/75/version/1.
61 Childers & Binder, supra note 1, at 97.
62 JACOBSON, supra note 26, at 10; Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander & Matthew
Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in US House
Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 75 (2006).
63 Thomas M. Holbrook & Aaron C. Wienschenk, Campaigns, Mobilization, and
Turnout in Mayoral Elections, 67 POL. RES. Q. 42, 46 (2014).
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also go on to show that the gap in campaign expenditures
between opposing party candidates strongly predicts the eventual
winner’s margin of victory.
Most elections are not competitive, as the data in Table 2
reflect. Through 2008, there have been 1970 citizen initiatives
voted on during federal election years since the 1904 primary
when Oregonians first cast a ballot for altering local liquor laws
and creating direct primaries. Of those, 455 were “competitive”
races, slightly over 23% of all initiative races. There have been
2863 legislative referenda during that same time span, of which
609 were competitive, just over 21% of the referenda. Popular
referenda, by far the least popular form of ballot measure, had
only 236 appearances on ballots and 47 were competitive, just
under 20%.
Table 2: Proposition Type and Number in
Federal Elections, 1892–200864
Form of Ballot
Proposition
Citizen
Initiatives
Legislative
Referenda
Popular
Referenda

Total N in
Federal
Elections

Competitive
Races

Uncompetitive
Races

Percentage
Competitive

1970

455

1515

23.1%

2863

609

2254

21.3%

236

47

189

19.9%

We use data for all ballot measures from 1892–2008,
provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures.65
Previous studies of initiatives’ effects on turnout use either the
number of initiatives on the ballot66 or a quadratic model with
the number of initiatives and the number of initiatives squared.67
As the authors explain, these approaches produce theoretically
and empirically questionable results.68 The former measure
posits that the number of initiative campaigns has a linear effect
on turnout. The latter predicts a positive relationship between
ballot measures and turnout over a certain number of values but
as the number of initiatives increases beyond a certain point,
voter turnout declines (voter fatigue). Instead, we argue it is
more likely that as the number of initiatives and referenda
increase, turnout does as well, but at a diminishing rate. Thus,
we use the square root of the number of initiatives and referenda.
Ballot Measures Database, supra note 34.
Id.
Tolbert, Grummel & Smith, supra note 4, at 631.
SMITH & TOLBERT, supra note 6, at 40–42; Tolbert, Grummel & Smith, supra note
4, at 635; Tolbert & Smith, supra note 4, at 296.
68 See Childers & Binder, supra note 1, at 98.
64
65
66
67
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We chose 1892 as a starting point for methodological and
practical reasons. Our initiative and referenda data come from
the National Conference of State Legislatures, and its database
stretches back to the early 1890s. In 1892, Idaho’s legislature
placed a measure on the state ballot that would have changed
how county commissioners were compensated. Otherwise, states
did not begin to use initiatives or referenda until the first decade
of the twentieth century after many Western states began
adopting the initiative as part of their constitutions.69 For most
states, beginning the analysis before 1900 gives us some
pre-treatment observations. We also include a number of
institutional, electoral, and demographic control variables that
the literature has shown also affect voter turnout, described in
Table 3.
Most time-series cross-sectional data exhibits auto- and
spatial-correlation, and we model our standard errors to address
that. In time-series analysis, it is often the case that one’s
dependent variable is correlated from one time period to the next
for each unit of analysis, and failing to control for that can bias
regression results.70 Our data also likely exhibits spatial
correlation, meaning that our dependent variable may be
correlated across states. For example, institutional reforms and
policy innovations in one state can affect policy outcomes and
political behavior across other states.71 At the same time, states
may react differently to political events that commonly affect
them. For example, the implementation of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 had varying effects across states.72 We
account for auto- and spatial-correlation using Driscroll and
Kraay standard errors and model the errors to have a lag over
four years.73 Finally, we also use state fixed effects to account for
changes within states over time that our model may not capture.

69 For a chronology, see DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT
INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989).
70 See Nathaniel Beck, Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in
the Past Few Years?, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 271, 281–82 (2001).
71 See, e.g., Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 853 (2008).
72 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–1973gg-10 (2012).
See generally Cynthia Rugeley & Robert A. Jackson, Getting on the Rolls: Analyzing the
Effects of Lowered Barriers on Voter Registration, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 56 (2009).
73 Driscoll and Kraay constructed a covariance matrix estimator “which is robust to
very general forms of spatial and temporal dependence as the time dimensions become
large.” John C. Driscoll & Aart C. Kraay, Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with
Spatially Dependent Panel Data, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 549, 550 (1998). Models using
these standard errors are easy to implement in time-series cross-sectional models in Stata
using a user-written command xtscc. See Daniel Hoechle, Robust Standard Errors for
Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence, 7 STATA J. 281 (2007).
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Table 3: The Operationalization of the Analysis’
Independent Variables and their Sources
Variables
Independent Variables of Interest
The square root of the number of competitive
initiatives and referenda and the square root of the
number of uncompetitive initiatives and referenda.
Competitive Initiatives
Uncompetitive Initiatives
Competitive Popular Referenda
Uncompetitive Popular Referenda
Competitive Legislative Referenda
Uncompetitive Legislative Referenda
Institutional Reforms
Adoption of the Secret Ballot
Extension of Suffrage to Women Voters
Changes in the Population
Percentage of Foreign Born Americans in Each State*
Percentage of Nonwhite Americans in Each State*
Percentage of the State’s Residents Who Live in Urban
Areas With a Population of At Least 2500 People*
State’s Rank in Education: To control for statewide
levels and to maintain consistency over the time
span of the data, we rank ordered the states for each
election year on the given Census measure at the
time.
*The historical census data are provided every ten years,
so we interpolate biannually across all states.
Electoral and Political Context
Party Competition: measures the average level of
competition between the major party candidates in
presidential (in presidential years), senatorial,
House, and gubernatorial elections. The measure
takes the average difference between the major

Sources
National Conference of State
Legislature74

Heckelman 199575
A Statistical History of the
American Electorate76
U.S. Census Bureau77
U.S. Census Bureau78
U.S. Census Bureau79
Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social
Research80

A Statistical History of the
American Electorate for
1870–1996 data. 1998–2008
data are from CQ Press.82

Ballot Measures Database, supra note 34.
See generally Jac C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout
Rates, 82 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1995).
76 RUSK, supra note 59, at 17–57.
77 Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Historical Census Statistics
on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000, (Feb. 2006), http://www.cen
sus.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FVUVEKV].
78 Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Historical Census Statistics
on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for
Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States, (Feb. 2005), http://www.cen
sus.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.pdf [http://perma.cc/5Z83-LVU8].
79 Id.
80 Michael R. Haines, Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The
United States, 1790-2002 (ICPSR 2896), ICPSR (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.icpsr.
umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2896?q=Michael+R.+Haines&amp;searchSource=findanalyze-home&amp;sortBy=.
74
75
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Variables
party candidates across those elections and subtracts
this value from 100. A zero reflects the complete
absence of two-party competition across a state in a
given year, whereas a score of 100 reflects “perfect
competition between the parties.”81
Presence of a senate election, measured using a
dichotomous measure.

Presence of a gubernatorial election, measured using a
dichotomous measure.

53

Sources

A Statistical History of the
American Electorate for
1870–1996 data. 1998–2008
data are from the Office of
the Clerk, U.S. House of
Representatives.83
A Statistical History of the
American
Electorate
for
1870–1996 data. 1998–2008
data are from Carl Klarner’s
“Governors Dataset.”84

V. THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS THAT INITIATIVES AND
REFERENDA HAVE ON TURNOUT
The evidence below largely supports our expectations and
advances our understanding of how direct democracy affects
voter participation. First, we corroborate previous work finding
that low information midterm elections are more conducive to
mobilization effects from ballot proposition campaigns than
presidential elections over time. Second, and more importantly,
we find that in addition to initiative races, legislative referenda
races increase turnout. The regression results presented in
Tables 3 and 4 confirm previous work on initiatives by the
authors, showing that competitive and uncompetitive initiatives
alike provide for a boost in turnout during midterm elections.
The regression model in Table 4 shows that initiatives and
referenda do not affect voter turnout across the states in
presidential elections. The table displays six models, and each
one has a key independent variable of interest. In the first model,
we see that the square root of the number of competitive
initiatives has a negative but fails to have a statistically
significant effect on a state’s turnout rate because the standard
error (in parentheses) is larger than the coefficient itself. The

82 Id. at 568–84; Voting and Elections Collection, CQ PRESS (Mar. 11, 2010),
http://library.cqpress.com/elections/index.php.
81 RUSK, supra note 59, at 558.
83 RUSK, supra note 59, at 639–53; Election Statistics, 1920 to Present, HIST., ART
& ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/
Election-Statistics/Election-Statistics/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2015).
84 RUSK, supra note 59, at 667–88; Voting and Elections Collection, supra note 82.
Data are also available from Carl Klarner, Governors Dataset, HARVARD DATAVERSE (July
13, 2015), https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/20408.
.
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models show the same pattern for our key coefficients in columns
two through five. Regardless of whether we are considering
competitive or uncompetitive initiatives or referenda, they fail to
reach statistical significance, indicating that they do not
significantly affect state turnout in presidential elections.
The regressions in Table 5 show that initiatives and
referenda do significantly affect statewide turnout in midterm
elections. The asterisks next to the coefficients indicate that they
have a statistically significant effect on turnout at the 0.05 level.
In the first column, we see that the square root of competitive
initiatives have a positive and significant effect on turnout. For
each additional competitive initiative on the ballot, turnout
increases by approximately 1.7%. Columns two and three reveal
that uncompetitive initiatives and competitive legislative
referenda positively and significantly increase statewide turnout.
However, the coefficient for uncompetitive initiatives is greater
than the coefficient for competitive legislative referenda,
meaning that relatively less competitive initiative elections have
greater impacts on turnout than competitive legislative referenda
elections. Columns four through six show that uncompetitive
legislative referenda and both types of popular referenda fail to
significantly affect statewide turnout.
Figure 4 graphs the marginal effects that the number of
initiatives and referenda can have on turnout in off-year
elections, as calculated from the results in Table 5. We only
present data for the coefficients that were statistically
significant. Though the marginal effects show potentially large
increase in turnout—up to eight percentage points when there
are twenty-one competitive initiatives—the maximum number in
our data was only eight. Colorado had eight in 1912, and our
results estimate a five-point jump in turnout. However, the
typical number of competitive initiatives on a ballot in any given
state is much lower. There was a maximum of twenty-one
uncompetitive initiatives in our sample, which predicts about a
five-point increase in turnout. Again, there are typically many
fewer of them on a ballot in any given year. Competitive
legislative referenda are more prevalent than competitive
initiatives and at the sample maximum of twelve in one election,
turnout increases by about 3.74%.
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Table 4: The Effects of Initiatives and Referenda on Voter Turnout in
the States During Presidential Elections, 1890–2008
√Competitive
Initiatives

(1)
-0.27
(0.32)

√Competitive
Leg. Ref.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.70
(0.46)

√Competitive
Pop Ref.

-0.38
(1.62)

√Uncomp.
Initiatives

-0.20
(0.35)

√Uncomp Leg
Ref.

-0.16
(0.51)

√Uncomp Pop
Ref.

-0.76
(0.79)

Party
Competition

0.33*
(0.02)

0.33*
(0.02)

0.33*
(0.02)

0.33*
(0.02)

0.33*
(0.02)

0.33*
(0.02)

Education

9.60*
(3.28)

9.47*
(3.21)

9.56*
(3.30)

9.55*
(3.31)

9.64*
(3.27)

9.46*
(3.29)

Foreign Born

0.29*
(0.11)

0.29*
(0.11)

0.29*
(0.11)

0.29*
(0.11)

0.29*
(0.11)

0.29*
(0.11)

Nonwhite

-0.31*
(0.14)

-0.31*
(0.14)

-0.31*
(0.14)

-0.31*
(0.14)

-0.31*
(0.14)

-0.31*
(0.14)

Percent Urban

0.08
(0.05)

0.07
(0.05)

0.08
(0.05)

0.08
(0.05)

0.08
(0.05)

0.07
(0.05)

Secret Ballot

-3.18
(2.26)

-3.17
(2.24)

-3.19
(2.26)

-3.21
(2.26)

-3.20
(2.25)

-3.19
(2.27)

Women’s
Suffrage

-7.77*
(1.91)

-7.76*
(1.91)

-7.78*
(1.91)

-7.76*
(1.90)

-7.78*
(1.91)

-7.73*
(1.91)

Gubernatorial
Election

1.26
(0.70)

1.28
(0.70)

1.26
(0.69)

1.25
(0.69)

1.25
(0.68)

1.24
(0.70)

Senate Election

0.28
(0.40)

0.22
(0.41)

0.27
(0.40)

0.28
(0.39)

0.27
(0.39)

0.29
(0.37)

Constant

35.27*
(7.90)

35.60*
(7.88)

35.38*
(7.93)

35.35*
(7.90)

35.22*
(8.05)

35.55*
(7.93)

N
1451
1451
1451
1451
1451
1451
States
50
50
50
50
50
50
Within-R2
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
*Indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level.
Note: Linear Regression with State Fixed Effects and Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors in
Parentheses.
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Table 5: The Effects of Initiatives and Referenda on Voter Turnout in
the States During Midterm Elections, 1890–2006
√Competitive
Initiatives

(1)
1.71*
(0.50)

√Competitive
Leg. Ref.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.98*
(0.47)

√Competitive
Pop Ref.

0.80*
(0.38)

√Uncomp.
Initiatives

0.60
(0.52)

√Uncomp
Leg Ref.

-0.70
(1.41)

√Uncomp
Pop Ref.

-0.06
(0.66)

Party
Competition

0.31*
(0.01)

0.30*
(0.01)

0.30*
(0.01)

0.31*
(0.01)

0.30*
(0.01)

0.30*
(0.01)

Education

2.22
(2.39)

1.99
(2.33)

2.01
(2.36)

2.04
(2.32)

1.77
(2.10)

2.04
(2.34)

Foreign Born

0.17
(0.11)

0.17
(0.11)

0.18
(0.11)

0.17
(0.11)

0.17
(0.11)

0.18
(0.11)

Nonwhite

-0.44*
(0.09)

-0.43*
(0.09)

-0.43*
(0.09)

-0.44*
(0.09)

-0.44*
(0.09)

-0.43*
(0.09)

Urban

-0.00
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.00
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.00
(0.03)

Secret Ballot

-9.61*
(0.98)

-9.52*
(0.97)

-9.55*
(0.96)

-9.57*
(1.00)

-9.54*
(0.97)

-9.55*
(0.96)

Women’s
Suffrage

-8.58*
(1.65)

-8.52*
(1.65)

-8.48*
(1.65)

-8.60*
(1.67)

-8.53*
(1.64)

-8.49*
(1.64)

Gov. Election

-3.59*
(0.45)

-3.60*
(0.44)

-3.59*
(0.47)

-3.63*
(0.45)

-3.64*
(0.45)

-3.59*
(0.47)

Sen. Election

0.17
(0.75)

0.23
(0.74)

0.25
(0.74)

0.21
(0.75)

0.23
(0.75)

0.24
(0.74)

Constant

43.69*
(4.31)

43.77*
(4.30)

43.58*
(4.31)

43.80*
(4.29)

44.31*
(4.14)

43.55*
(4.32)

N
1441
1441
1441
1441
1441
1441
States
50
50
50
50
50
50
Within-R2
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
* Indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level.
Note: Linear Regression with State Fixed Effects and Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors in
Parentheses.
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Figure 4: The Marginal Effects of Ballot Propositions on
Turnout in Midterm Elections, 1890–200685

Control variables in both the midterm and presidential
elections reinforce traditional findings in the literature about the
role that institutions, demographics, and political context have
on drawing voters to the polls. Women’s suffrage and the secret
ballot significantly decreased voting eligible turnout in both
midterm and presidential elections. Their effects, however, vary
slightly by whether it is a presidential or a midterm year. A
state’s rank in census education indicators (see Table 3 for an
explanation) has a strong and robust effect on turnout in
presidential election years, but little effect in midterm elections.
85 See supra Table 5. This graphs the marginal effects of competitive initiatives,
uncompetitive initiatives, and competitive legislative referenda on voter turnout in
midterm elections as the number of each type of ballot proposition increases from zero to
twenty-one. This is based on the regression results in Table 5. To calculate the marginal
effects of an independent variable on the dependent variable in a linear regression, as the
independent variable increases from zero to infinity (or another theoretically interesting
limit), you multiply the independent variable’s coefficient by the value of the independent
variable. For example, each data point in the competitive initiatives plot line is equal to
the coefficient for the square root of competitive initiatives (1.71) (see Table 5) multiplied
by the respective number on the x-axis. The plot lines for uncompetitive initiatives and
competitive legislative referenda were calculated similarly. Hollow markers indicate out
of sample predictions. The maximum number of competitive initiatives in one election was
eight in Colorado in 1912, and the maximum number of competitive legislative referenda
was twelve in California in 1914 and Alabama in 1994. See Initiative, Referendum and
Recall, supra note 7.

Do Not Delete

58

2/14/2016 9:56 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

The size of a state’s foreign-born population has significant
negative effects on turnout in presidential elections while the
size of its nonwhite population also negatively affects turnout
(but in both presidential and midterm elections).
The state of political competition overall also has a major
impact on a state’s turnout rate in both presidential and midterm
elections. In presidential elections, the most competitive states
(close to 50–50 support for each major party) can have an
approximately ten percentage point increase in turnout over very
uncompetitive states (65–35 support for one party). The most
competitive partisan atmosphere, when each party gets on
average 50% of the two party share across elections in that state,
equals 100 on Rusk’s scale. A state where one party averages
65% support across elections while the other averages 35%, earns
a 70 on Rusk’s scale. Thus, turnout is about ten points higher in
the most competitive state compared to one where there is a
65−35
split
between
Democrats
and
Republicans
((100*.33)−(70*.33)=10). Party competition has almost the same
impact in midterm elections when one performs the same
calculation for coefficients in Table 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article contributes to our understanding of how ballot
propositions affect political participation in three ways. First, we
show that legislative referenda races affect turnout. More
specifically, competitive legislative referendums draw voters to
the polls and less competitive ones do not. Secondly, they have
weaker effects on turnout than either competitive or
uncompetitive citizen initiatives. Thirdly, we also show that
popular referenda do not boost turnout over time. They may
garner some campaign activity because they require citizens to
gather signatures across the state, but that does not translate
into campaigns that are vigorous enough to stimulate the
electorate.
Our evidence corroborates other claims suggesting that
direct democracy draws voters to the polls via campaign
mobilization. As we explained in a previous section, campaigns
allocate their resources in areas where the race is most
competitive and they spend more money overall as races get more
competitive. Thus, they allocate their money to mobilize voters
and do so in ways to get the most bang-for-their-buck. Tolbert,
Bowen, and Donovan use campaign spending data from a few
recent election years to illustrate that spending per capita on all
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ballot questions in a state increases turnout.86 Their work, along
with our findings above and previous work on competitive versus
uncompetitive initiatives, strongly suggests that ballot
proposition campaigns mobilize voters.87
We also acknowledge that our work, along with the others
cited above, has an important limitation that future research
needs to address. One take-home point of this Article is that all
ballot measures are not created equal. Initiatives and referenda
(legislative and popular) have differential impacts on the level of
political engagement in a state. The mobilization thesis will be
even more convincing when scholars are able to show that
individual ballot races that are more intense have a stronger
impact on turnout than races with less intensity using data on
actual campaign expenditures from individual campaigns.
Research on candidate elections shows this in abundance, and,
hopefully, direct democracy scholars will soon join their ranks.

86
87

Tolbert, Bowen & Donovan, supra note 4, at 181.
See generally Childers & Binder, supra note 1.
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